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ARGUMENT
I.

PARR WADDOUPS OVERSTATES THE REACH OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE ELEMENTS DEFINED BY THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT.

Appellees Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, a Utah
professional corporation; Clark Waddoups ("Waddoups"); Jonathan O.
Hafen ("Hafen") and Justin P. Matkin ("Matkin") (collectively "Parr
Waddoups") argue in their Appellees' Brief for a broad and sweeping
definition of the judicial proceedings privilege, asserting that the arguments
of Appellants Susan I. Moss ("Moss") and Jamal S. Yanaki ("Yanaki") in
their Opening Brief about the judicial proceedings privilege is properly
applied are "contrary to clear case law and the policy implications that
support such law." Appellees' Brief, at 11.
What Moss and Yanaki had argued was:
[The Lawyer] Defendants are not being sued in this case for
making any defamatory statement or, indeed, any statement at
all. They are instead being sued for illegally searching
plaintiffs' home and removing plaintiffs' property. Not one of
the privilege cases cited by defendants involves suit over a
non-consensual and illegal warrantless entry into a plaintiffs
home and conduct of an illegal search and seizure.
Opening Brief, at 29-30. Moss and Yanaki has carefully analyzed all of the
Utah Supreme Court cases which had been decided on the judicial
proceedings privilege issue and none of them had approved the application

1

of the privilege in the absence of some defamatory statement. Appellees'
Brief cites Utah cases which were already discussed in footnote 8 on page
30 of the Opening Brief and that discussion will not be repeated here.
However, a more recent case from the Utah Supreme Court which Parr
Waddoups had not raised below but which they touch on in the Appellees'
Brief, at 11-12, O'Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, 165 P.3d 1214, also
supports Moss and Yanaki's argument.
In O'Conner, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly, plainly and clearly
set forth the required elements for the application of the judicial
proceedings privilege in this state:
The judicial proceeding privilege has three elements. First, the
alleged defamatory statement must have been made during
or in the course of a judicial proceeding. Second, the
statement must have some reference to the proceeding's
subject matter. Third, the party claiming the privilege must
have been acting in the capacity of a judge, juror, witness,
litigant, or counsel in the proceeding at the time of the alleged
defamation.
O'Conner, 2007 UT 58, fl 31, 165 P.3d at 1222-23 (emphasis added).
Although this aspect of the case is not addressed by Parr Waddoups, at
the core of each of the three elements required for the application of the
judicial proceedings privilege is the requirement that "an alleged
defamatory statement" is the center of all of the claims as to which the
judicial proceedings privilege may be applied. This is precisely
2

what Moss and Yanaki argued that the elements of the privilege required,
so their arguments are not only not "contrary to clear case law and the
policy implications that support such law[ ]" their arguments are precisely
correct.
If the judicial proceedings privilege were capable of being applied in
the broad scope suggested by Parr Waddoups, there could be no tort of
abuse of process, no sanctions under Rule 11 and, indeed, no sanctions of
any kind for any conduct of a litigant or its counsel, because so long as the
conduct leading to sanctions occurred during the course of litigation, had
some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding and the litigant or
lawyer were a litigant or lawyer, the judicial proceedings privilege would
protect them absolutely from abuse of process claims or sanctions.1
1

Although Parr Waddoups asserts that "Courts . . . have routinely held that
the privilege applies to abuse of process claims[,]" Appellees' Brief, at 13, Parr
Waddoups apparently could not find any Utah court decisions routinely reaching
such a holding. An analysis of the California case cited by Parr Waddoups
reveals that the Court's holding is based on the unique statutory law of California,
reflecting a policy of its Legislature to extend the privilege beyond merely
allegedly defamatory communications, to encompass any communication in
judicial proceedings. Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057, 128 P.3d 713,
718, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516, 522 (2006). In addition, the only wrongful conduct
before the court in Rusheen appears to have been the "filing [of] perjured
declarations of service . ..." Id, 37 Cal. 4th at 1062, 128 P.3d at 722, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 526. So the court concluded that, "[o]n close analysis, the gravamen
of the action was not the levying act, but the procurement of the judgment based
on the use of allegedly perjured declarations of service. Because these
declarations were communications '(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve
(continued...)
3

In sum, Parr Waddoups' proposal that the judicial proceedings
privilege may be applied, in this state, to tort claims that are not somehow
grounded in the making of an alleged defamatory statement is a proposal
that stretches far beyond any application of the privilege that has been
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. Because the English Common
Law has plainly allowed for tort actions to redress injury caused by torts
committed under the auspices of an illegal order for at least a quarter of a
millennium, see Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Center, 300 Md. 520,
479 A.2d 921 (Ct. App. 1984) and that pre-existing English Common Law
was adopted by the Utah Legislature as the law of this state upon
statehood, see American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 401j 50
& n.17, 140 P.3d 1235, 1250-51 & n.17 ("The common law of England, so
far as It is not repugnant to, or in conflict with the constitution and laws of
the United States, or the constitution and laws of this state, shall be the
rule of decision in all the courts of this state." [quoting

1

UTAH REV. STAT.

§

(...continued)
the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation
to the action" [citation omitted], the litigation privilege applies to the declarations
and protects against torts arising from the privileged declarations.'" Id., 37 Cal.
4th at 1062, 128 P.3d at 722, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 526-27. In remarkable contrast,
in this action, Parr Waddoups, together with their co-conspirators, threatened to
kick in the door to a private home, entered the private home without consent and
then embarked on an illegal search and seizure.
4

2488 (1898)]), Moss and Yanaki's common law claims alleged in this case,
which are not derived from any allegation of a defamatory statement, but
instead from an illegal home invasion, are secured to Moss and Yanaki by
statute.2
II.

THE ORDER PARR WADDOUPS OBTAINED WAS ILLEGAL AND SO
PROVIDES NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORTS COMMITTED

As their principal argument asking this Court to ignore the binding
precedent of M e n v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941),
in which the Utah Supreme Court held private search warrants to be
2

Parr Waddoups cites several other cases. Many involve California law,
which, as discussed in Note 1, supra, is grounded on a unique statutory definition
of the judicial privilege in which the California Legislature saw fit to expand the
privilege beyond its historical limits of application to claims grounded upon
defamatory statements. Because the explanatory parenthetical used by Parr
Waddoups on its citation to Lambdin Funeral Service, Inc. V.Griffith, 559 S.W. 2d
791 (Tenn. 1978) gives the impression that the privilege applies in blanket
fashion to all invasion of privacy claims, see Appellees Brief, at 14, that case
must be addressed. In Lambdin, the underlying conduct upon which the invasion
of privacy claim was based was "the publication by the defendant of alleged acts
of misconduct by the plaintiff." Id., at 792. Thus, again unlike this case, the
claims were grounded in an alleged defamatory statement and it is in that context
that an invasion of privacy claim would be barred by the judicial proceedings
privilege and not by the unauthorized entry into a private home. In fact, none of
the cases cited by Parr Waddoups address the situation of an illegal search and
seizure conducted within a private home. Likewise, Parr Waddoups' citation to
Thornton v. Rhoden, 53 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706 (Ct. App. 1966), with
the explanatory parenthetical stating: "abuse of process based on discovery
allegedly conducted for improper purposes[,]" Appellees' Brief, at 14-15, in fact
involved allegedly defamatory statements made in a deposition. See id., 53 Cal.
App. 2d at 82, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 708. So, again, the underlying basis of the
claimed abuse of process related to defamatory statements. That is not the case
here.
5

unconstitutional under both the United States and Utah Constitutions, Parr
Waddoups states: "[T]he search warrant at issue in Allen improperly
imported criminal procedures into a civil lawsuit; the search warrant was
not styled as a discovery order issued pursuant to the Rules of Civil
Procedure . . .." Appellees' Brief, at 30 (emphasis added). Moss and
Yanaki submit first that it is the substance of what an order purports to
allow, rather than how it is styled, which governs whether the order violates
their constitutional rights. The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that
"[the Court] ha[sj held that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
often provides greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth
Amendment, despite nearly identical language." State v. Worwood, 2007
UT 47, 16, 164 P.3d 397, 404. The proposition that the name placed on
an illegal order purporting to authorize a search of a private home by the
police, private litigants and their attorneys would somehow make it legal is
contrary to the afore-stated jurisprudential analysis of the right of privacy in
Utah. The facts of Allen are substantively distinguishable from the facts in
this case only in the fact that in this case the privacy interests invaded
were of even greater significance because a private home which was
invaded by the police, litigants and their counsel, while in Allen it was a
place of business which was illegally searched. Allen, 100 Utah at 43,
6

110P.2d355.358.
While Parr Waddoups desires to characterize the order as a
"discovery order," Appellees' Brief, at 30, no provision of the rules of civil
procedure ostensibly authorize an ex parte home invasion and search by
the police, litigants and their counsel, such as was conducted here, as a
discovery device. If the discovery rules did purport to authorize such a
private search warrant, they would nevertheless be unconstitutional under
the holding in Allen. The same is true for Parr Waddoups' argument that
the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act authorizes such a private search
warrant, see Appellees Brief, at 26.3 Allen holds such invasions of privacy
to be unconstitutional under the federal and state constitutions and such
3

ln any event, Parr Waddoups already argued to the federal court that Utah
Uniform Trade Secrets Act authorized such a discovery process and that
argument was rejected. Yanaki v. lomed, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1263 (D. Utah
2004)("neither does the Act authorize the particular variety of discovery process
of which [Moss and Yanaki] complain[ ].") Indeed, the Court held: "The fact that
the statutes and constitutional provisions lomed [and Parr Waddoups] identified
in its Memorandum do not provide any authority for the particular type of Search
Order obtained in this case is central to Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted." Id. It is no doubt for that reason that Parr Waddoups
chose not to appeal that ruling of the federal court, but having prevailed in part on
that basis in federal court and choosing not to appeal, issue preclusion now
applies: "Issue preclusion applies only when the following four elements are met:
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and
(iv) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Oman v.
Davis Sch. Dist, 2008 UT 70, U 29, 194 P.3d 956, 965.
7

invasions remain unconstitutional under any and every act or rule which
may be enacted unless and until the Constitution itself is amended.
Parr Waddoups also contends that the illegal search was otherwise
reasonable. See Appellees' Brief, at 30. The same assertion was made
by the same Parr Waddoups parties in Yanaki v. lomed, Case No.
2:03CV0345 DB. See Exhibit A to "Notice of Filing of Defendants'
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah , Case No. 2:03cv0345 DB, Which
Memorandum Was Referenced and Submitted in Oral Argument in this
Action on February 15, 2007" (R. 587-608), at R.595-598. Parr Waddoups
previously made this argument to Judge Benson as a basis for dismissal of
the federal lawsuit, and lost on this issue. See Yanaki v. lomed, 319 F.
Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 n.7 ("Nonetheless, it appears clear that the conduct
complained of in this case would be in violation of the Fourth Amendment if
state action were involved. The invasion of Plaintiffs home, supported only
by an ex parte submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit, appears
to be precisely the type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling
that the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent.") Again, Parr
Waddoups did not appeal, even though it lost this issue, and so issue
preclusion applies.
8

Moreover, Parr Waddoups, although claiming that the search was
reasonable "in the interest of preserving . . . evidence." Appellees' Brief, at
25. As was already pointed out in the Opening Brief, however, the
"Confidential New Product" Yanaki was alleged to have stolen could not be
described in any way in written form. Opening Brief, at 22-23. Moreover,
there was no danger that Yanaki was going to destroy evidence when, as
pleaded, he was in the state of Colorado. First Amended Complaint, fl 15,
R. 133. Indeed, Yanaki's last day of employment had been January 17,
2002, R. 50)(lomed Complaint, Tj 50), but the supposedly exigent search
did not occur for three months thereafter, First Amended Complaint, fl 8,
R. 131 (yet lomed had received an e-mail shortly after Yanaki left
employment supposedly evidencing a disclosure of trade secrets, R. 51
(lomed Complaint, j | 39)).
Perhaps most tellingly, however, and supportive of the ulterior motive
pleaded in the First Amended Complaint, fflj 8-9, 32 (that the search was in
fact designed to send a message to lomed employees that they were not
safe if they left employment) is the fact that Parr Waddoups chose to
search the private home of Moss and Yanaki rather than the business
premises of Yanaki's co-defendant, Ceramatec, Inc. or the home of codefendant Ashok Joshi, who had never been an lomed employee.
9

Certainly, Ceramatec, Inc. and Joshi held the same evidence that Yanaki
was accused of holding. But only an ex-lomed employee's home was
selected for an illegal search. No matter whether the protection of
evidence was at issue, Allen instructs that a private search warrant is not,
under Utah law, the way to go about obtaining that evidence.4
III.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PETITION GOVERNMENT DOES NOT
PROTECT DEFENDANTS AGAINST TORTS ARISING FROM THEIR ILLEGAL
INVASION OF MOSS AND YANAKI'S HOME.

This alleged defense is in reality a red herring. First of all, "the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine[ ] provides immunity from antitrust liability for
petitions to the courts, provided that those petitions are objectively
reasonable." Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 916, 913 (10th Cir. 2000). Parr
Waddoups is not being sued over antitrust liability. Parr Waddoups is also
not being sued because it or its client petitioned the government for

4

lt is worth noting at this point that Parr Waddoups' arguments about
Courts "routinely" granting such ex parte search and seizure orders is not a
justification to allow such an unconstitutional practice, if it actually is such, to
continue. Parr Waddoups mentions the Copyright Act's permission for such ex
parte seizures. Appellees' Brief, at 28 n.13 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 503(1), 503(3)).
However, even though seizures under that Act have proceeded under very
specific rules drafted by the United States Supreme Court, significant
constitutional questions remain about the legitimacy of seizures under the
Copyright Act. See generally Paul S. Owens, Impoundment Procedures under
the Copyright Act: the Constitutional Infirmities, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211 (Fall
1985). But, again, the Utah Supreme Court has spoken definitively in Allen,
outlawing such procedures in Utah.
10

redress by filing a complaint against Yanaki, ActivaTek, L.C., Ceramatec,
Inc. or Ashok Joshi. Nor is Parr Waddoups being sued for seeking
discovery under the rules of civil procedure.
Parr Waddoups is instead being sued for the commission of torts
exclusively related to the unlawful invasion of Moss and Yanaki's home
and the conduct of an illegal search and seizure therein. As the United
States Court of Appeals recognized in the context of the tort of false
imprisonment, the tort's element of illegality "effectively prevents any
infringement on or chilling of. . . First Amendment rights by the instant
action." Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 916 (10th Cir. 2000). Here, the
unconstitutional and illegal nature of the invasion of the home, themselves,
effectively prevent any infringement upon or chilling of legitimate rights,
lomed and the Parr Waddoups lawyers were free to make use of any legal
form of discovery they wished. Instead, they chose to engage in illegal
conduct designed to frighten their client's remaining employees.
In Anderson Development Co., LC. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d
323, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment
protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine had evolved beyond antitrust
liability, but only so far as "to 'protect. . . political activity against tort
claims as well as antitrust claims,' Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684
11

(Utah 1982)." Anderson Development, at H 26, 332 (emphasis added).
This case, like it involves no antitrust claims, also involves no tort claims
arising out of political activity. No court, in Utah or outside of Utah, has
extended such First Amendment protections to encompass invading
someone's private home.
IV.

NEITHER MOSS NOR YANAKI ARE PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING THEIR
CLAIMS BY VIRTUE OF ISSUE PRECLUSION.

Parr Waddoups alleges that Moss and Yanaki could have and should
have appealed from the illegal order in the underlying lomed litigation and
that their failure to do so precludes them from raising their tort claims here.
This argument fails for many reasons.
First, Moss was not a party to the underlying litigation in which Parr
Waddoups sued Yanaki. She was a non-party who was simply abused by
Parr Waddoups invasion of her home and privacy. Moss was not in a
position to intervene at any time prior to the invasion of her home, as she
has neither claims nor defenses to assert. The claims Moss acquired upon
the occurrence of the illegal home invasion are utterly unrelated to any
underlying merits of the underlying lomed case against Yanaki, so she
would not even have a permissive basis to intervene in that action,
because no statute conferred upon her any conditional right to intervene

12

and she had no claim or defense which has a question of law or fact in
common with the claims asserted in the lomed litigation. See UTAH R.

CIV.

P. 24(b)(permissive intervention allowed only "(1) when a statute confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.")
Yanaki, as a party to that litigation, could have appealed from a final
judgment on the merits in the case, but none was ever entered because it
was settled. Perhaps he could have filed a petition for permission to file a
discretionary appeal of the illegal ex parte order but there was no effective
relief available to him from such an application. By the time Yanaki
returned to the state of Utah, the illegal invasion of his home , the terrorism
of his wife and the seizure of his property were a fait accompli. The privacy
of Moss and Yanaki had been irretrievably shattered and no appeal of that
order could ever make right the wrong which occurred. No Appellate Court
could provide any effective remedy for what had already occurred and the
law does'ribt require Yanaki to engage in a useless act of appeal when
only damages will remedy the injury. See Leger Construction v. Roberts,
Inc., 550 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976)(law will not require one to do a
useless thing).
In addition, the elements of issue preclusion, which is the modern
13

name for the collateral estoppel which Parr Waddoups argues, are not met.
Unlike the case of Buzzanco v. Lord Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 376 (W.D. Pa.
2001), in which Parr Waddoups concedes that "the court recognized that
one of the plaintiffs had brought a motion in the underlying case postseizure regarding the seizure order and the judge had 'confirmed the
issuance of the writ."' Appellees Brief, at 24. Thus, unlike here, a specific
challenge to the legality of the order had been raised, litigated and ruled on
in Buzzanco.
Issue preclusion applies only when the following four elements
are met: (i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted
must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must
be identical to the one presented in the instant action; (iii) the
issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and
fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.
Oman v. Davis School District, 2008 UT 70, U 29, 194 P.3d 956, 965.
Here, the issue was not fully and fairly litigated by the trial court which had
issued the ex parte order in the underlying case. Moss was neither a party
nor in privity with Yanaki with respect to the lomed case. The issue
decided by the trial judge was not identical with the issues raised here and,
finally, because the lomed case was settled, there was no final judgment
on the merits. In sum, the requisite elements for the application of issue

14

preclusion are absent.
V.

Moss AND YANAKI'S

CLAIMS ARE ADEQUATELY PLEADED.

Moss and Yanaki refer to their Opening Brief on the question of
whether their claims were adequately pleaded under Rule 8, with the
exception of Parr Waddoups' argument that an "independent, willful act"
has not been pleaded for the abuse of process claim. The conduct of an
illegal search and seizure as pleaded plainly constitutes a willful and
independent act. So, too, does the threat to kick in Moss front door if she
did not open it. Since private search warrants are unconstitutional under
both the federal and state constitutions, it is not possible for any civil
process to have as its legitimate end the unconstitutional invasion of a
private citizen's home. Indeed, Parr Waddoups even seized property
belonging to Moss, a non-party.
CONCLUSION
For the sake of upholding the proscription of the Utah Constitution
against unreasonable searches and seizures of private citizens' homes, as
well as the remaining reasons set forth herein and in the Opening Brief, the
dismissal of Moss and Yanaki's tort claims should be reversed, the claims
reinstated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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